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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 27/01/2008 Accident number: 514 
Accident time: Not made available Accident Date: 26/06/2003 
Where it occurred: Not made available Country: Iraq 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: Not made available 
ID original source: None Name of source: [Name removed] 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: BLU-97 submunition Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 27/01/2008 
No of victims: 2 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not made available Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate survey (?) 
inadequate area marking (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?) 
 
Accident report 
Details of this accident have been withheld by the demining NGO that employed the Victim. A 
spreadsheet including the Victim’s name and very brief details of the accident was made 
available in 2007. Some details can be inferred from the information released. For example, it 
is reasonable to presume that the Victims were repositioning markers inside the area known 
to be cleared/safe. 
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This entry will be expanded if access to the report of the investigation is made available in 
future. 
The spreadsheet data is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
“Date and country. [Name removed]: fatal 
[Name removed]: fatal 
BLU 97 detonated when two members of staff moving to reposition minefield 
markers, suspected stepped on partially buried BLU-97.” 
[From interview with demining group staff, it is known that the task was a BLU-97 strike area 
and not a minefield.] 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 672 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: Not made available 
 
Summary of injuries: 
FATAL 
COMMENT: Multiple injury: No medical report was made available. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 673 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: Not made available 
 
Summary of injuries: 
FATAL 
COMMENT: Multiple injury: No medical report was made available. 
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Analysis 
This incident is classed as a “Missed-mine accident” because it seems that the device that 
detonated was inside the area cleared. If it was not, then this would become yet another 
“Survey accident” (the demining group had several in Iraq at this time). The primary cause of 
this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the victims went to place 
markers in an area that was believed to be safe but which was not. Those responsible for the 
work should have kept an accurate record of the safe area. It seems that the field controllers 
may also have allowed safety distances to be ignored.  The secondary cause is listed as a 
“Management control inadequacy” because the management of the demining group declined 
to make the accident details available. Although this is sometimes done to protect the Victims, 
in this case the Victims’ names were among the limited detail made available. It is possible 
that the managers have chosen to avoid transparency because they are afraid that the 
circumstances of the accident would reflect badly on their organisation. 
It is known that the Victims had been recently moved from the North of Iraq to conduct 
submunition clearance and it is possible that they did not fully understand the threat posed by 
the BLU-97 and its potential sensitivity to any movement, including the placement of markers 
close by. 
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